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Put over a Barrel? “Smart” Sanctions, Petroleum and Statecraft 









With the rise of “smart” sanctions in international politics, the oil sector of some of 
the world’s leading oil exporters has emerged as a key target. Russia’s oil sector 
presents a recent case. Much of the scholarly discourse on sanctions has focused on 
whether and under what conditions sanctions work as intended. Much less has been 
the attention on the process through which sanctions are having an impact. This 
article aims to further deepen our understanding of this less explored area by focusing 
on a target country’s response. It argues that the statecraft of developing a response to 
sanctions could have substantial role in determining their impact. The paper provides 
an in-depth case study of how Russia responded to sanctions on its petroleum industry 
during the five-year period after 2014. It analyses in detail Russia’s response with 
respect to three key structural constraints for the oil industry: the tax regime, the 
industry’s organisational setup, and its chronic technological lag. The response in 
each area has presented opportunities to neutralise or mitigate the impact of sanctions. 
The paper highlights the limited extent of the Russian government’s response to this 

























With the rise of “smart” sanctions 1 in international politics, the oil sector of 
some of the world’s leading oil exporters has unsurprisingly emerged as a key target. 
Iraq, Iran and Venezuela witnessed their oil industries coming under punitive 
measures in the past three decades. More recently, in response to Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea in 2014, its oil industry also emerged as a target of international sanctions.  
Russia’s case appears peculiar in several respects, arguably turning the stakes 
much higher. First, the targeted country has long aspired for being a global power.  It 
stockpiles the world’s largest inventory of nuclear warheads, and has a permanent seat 
at the United Nations Security Council [1]. Second, it is the largest oil producer ever 
subjected to sanctions. Third, the Russian leadership is well familiar with energy 
sanctions as a policy tool—it has frequently launched such sanctions against target 
countries in the past three decades [2]. Finally, Russia’s international standing and oil 
have been closely intertwined in the post-Soviet period. Oil revenues have been 
critical for Russia’s economic revival after 2000 [3]. Oil exports have brought over 3 
trillion USD during the Putin era, arguably helping Russia with its military build-up 
and its growing international reach.2 
Much of the scholarly discourse on sanctions has focused on whether 
sanctions work as intended. A growing strand of literature, particularly oriented 
towards policy-makers, has focused on the statecraft of designing sanctions [5]. Much 
less has been the attention on how sanctions actually work. The process through 
which sanctions are having an impact has remained largely unexplored [6, 7]. Such an 
																																																								
1 “Smart” sanctions are defined as precision-guided measures, designed to inflict the least damage on 
the overall population while inducing the targeted government to take the desired action. Their 
effectiveness is a subject to an extensive debate. 
2 Author’s calculations, from ([4] 2000-2019 period). 
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approach, however, could understate the potentially significant and long-lasting 
implications of sanctions, even if they fail to secure the desired behavior. 
This article aims to further deepen our understanding of this less explored area 
by bringing a new dimension that focuses on a different type of statecraft—a target 
country’s response. The approach presented here suggests that target states need not 
be treated as passive actors with respect to sanctions. They can take deliberate action 
to neutralise or at least mitigate the specific effects intended by sanctions.  
The analysis here provides an early attempt to understand what may constitute 
a “smart response” to “smart” sanctions. This article suggests that the way target 
states react to sanctions could be as significant as their design. Its underpinning logic 
is that target states react differently, and this affects whether and how sanctions work. 
Overall, it aims to draw attention to this significant process that has been widely 
overlooked.  
The paper’s main research objective is to examine Russia’s response to 
sanctions targeting its petroleum industry since 2014. It sheds light on key policy 
choices that the Russian leadership has adopted (or failed to adopt) to mitigate the 
effect of these sanctions. How “smart” has Russia’s response been and what explains 
the chosen approach? Along its theoretical implications, the paper has the purpose to 
be highly policy-relevant—a significant, albeit occasionally overlooked goal in 
energy-related studies [8].  
 
 




This article builds on Richard Connolly’s distinction of two key concepts in 
the study of sanctions as a tool of economic statecraft: impact and effectiveness. 
“Impact” refers to “observable changes in the political and economic landscape of the 
target country caused by sanctions”. “Effectiveness” is about “whether sanctions 
perform the functions they are intended to perform by the sender(s)” [6]. Overall, 
impact is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for effectiveness of sanctions. Yet 
sanctions are highly unlikely to be effective if they have no impact [6].  
Based on this distinction, this paper suggests two alternative concepts when 
evaluating “smart” sanctions. One could think of sanctions in terms of their objectives 
in two phases. There are “intermediary objectives” and then there are “end goals”. 
The former would ideally help to reach the latter. The intermediary objective is to 
cause damage to a specific target. Depending on the design of sanctions and the target 
itself, this damage could take effect immediately or steadily. The underlying 
assumption here is that the target is not invincible: there is some element of 
vulnerability. If not, then launching the sanctions will be of little practical value. 
Sanctions are smarter if they build well on this vulnerability.  
By contrast, the end goals of sanctions are all about accomplishing broader 
policy objectives (i.e. effectiveness). The literature on sanctions typically refers to the 
following three: coercing the target country to alter its behaviour, constraining its 
actions and sending its leadership a message that its conduct will not be tolerated [9]. 
A key step to understand a target country’s response is analysing whether and 
how it takes action to neutralise or mitigate the intermediary objective(s) of “smart” 
sanctions. Studying this is critical in evaluating the impact and effectiveness of 
sanctions. A target country that manages to weaken the impact of sanctions could 
potentially jeopardise their end goals as well. At a minimum, by taking mitigating 
	
	 5	
actions, it can raise the transaction costs of sender states by prompting them to revise 
some aspect of the sanctions [10]. 
Thus, the starting point in studying a target country’s response would be to 
define the intermediary objective(s) of sanctions in clear terms. Next, one can analyse 
the responses of the target state by presenting them on a continuum. On the one end, a 
government has the choice of abstaining from any action following the onset of 
sanctions. This type of a response would keep the target exposed to sanctions as long 
as they remain active. Alternatively, a government could adopt stopgap measures that 
temporarily alleviate the concerns raised by sanctions. Such policies would be at the 
expense of delaying efforts to address the core sources of vulnerabilities exposed by 
sanctions. As such, opting for stopgap measures could constitute a shortsighted 
approach—they are not likely to provide lasting solutions and effectively neutralise 
the sanctions’ intermediary objectives. On the other end, the target state may embrace 
the sanctions as a wake-up call. In this case, its policies would be more 
comprehensive, necessitating higher upfront costs. They would be aimed at 
addressing some fundamental (structural) underlying constraints that have contributed 
to the target’s vulnerability.  
Analysing the continuum of a target state’s responses could contribute to our 
understanding of what might constitute a “smart” response to sanctions—namely a 
response that successfully neutralises the intermediary objectives of sanctions. The 
case study in this article is merely a step in this direction.  The analysis here could be 
further elaborated by developing additional metrics about a larger number of target 
countries’ responses. This would eventually allow building a comprehensive 
framework on the “smartness” of target states’ response as a factor in the 
effectiveness of sanctions.  
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Along this theoretical significance, this case study acknowledges several 
potential limitations. First, the degree of vulnerability of a target state may vary, 
which may affect the scope of its reaction to sanctions. In a study with a larger 
sample, this methodological problem could be addressed by developing metrics about 
vulnerability, whereby a “smart response” would indicate a reaction commensurate 
with the extent of vulnerability. Second, there is one inevitable uncertainty in the case 
of sanctions: how long will they last? Thus, the underlying assumption that a 
comprehensive “wake-up call” response would qualify as “smarter” relates primarily 
to cases when sanctions are likely to remain for an extended duration. Third, a longer 
timeframe to analyse a target country’s response to sanctions is likely to generate 
more credible conclusions on its ability to neutralise sanctions. Finally, assumptions 
about future global oil demand may skew the assessment of a target state’s response. 
States are expected to be less concerned with the longer-term impact of their policies 
on their oil industry if oil demand is to peak sooner. The paper’s underlying 
assumption, open to be challenged amidst growing public recognition of climate 
change, is that oil revenues will remain critical for the Russian economy for about at 
least two decades. 
This article adheres to qualitative analysis through an in-depth case study of 
Russia’s response to “smart” sanctions on its oil industry. It examines the 
government’s response during the five-year period following the launch of sanctions 
in 2014. The study identifies an increasingly pertinent geological challenge as a key 
vulnerability facing the Russian petroleum industry. The analysis shows that 
augmenting this vulnerability appears the major intermediary objective of the 
sanctions. To investigate the government’s response to sanctions, the paper examines 
three structural problems that stand at the core of Russia’s geological challenge: the 
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tax regime, the oil industry’s organisational setup, and its chronic technological lag. 
Admittedly, addressing any of these structural problems is not a simple task whether 
or not a country faces sanctions. Yet, in each case, their resolution depends much less 
on global oil markets than the government’s will to take action. The key question is 
whether sanctions triggered a reaction in these areas. Incidentally, the paper reveals a 
significant variation in the government’s response to the three structural problems in 
2014-2019 period. Explaining the key policy choices and the reasons behind the 
variation in the government’s approach appears as an additional objective. 
The paper begins with a brief overview of the US/EU energy sanctions, 
highlighting their intermediary objective. Next, it describes Russia’s geological 
challenge as a key source of vulnerability. Finally, the study examines in detail the 
three key structural challenges for the oil industry. The analysis is in two parts. The 
first part establishes a baseline about the state of these structural problems prior to the 
onset of sanctions. Then, the focus shifts to the evolving approach of the Russian 
government with respect to each of these three issues.  
  
 
3. The US/EU “smart” sanctions on Russian oil 
 
Since its annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia has been subject to a series of 
sanctions. After several months targeting primarily select Russian individuals, the US 
and the EU expanded the sanctions to include punitive measures on key sectors: 
energy, financial services and defense. Within the energy sector, the oil industry has 
been the main target. During the period of this study, US/EU sanctions were 
progressively expanded to include new specific targets within Russia, though not 
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necessarily as a reaction to the Russian government’s response to sanctions.  Their 
design has left an inherent uncertainty about their future scope and intensity, leaving 
room for further measures. 
The choice to target the oil sector is indicative that the US and the EU have 
recognised the special role it plays in the Russian economy. Oil has remained 
Russia’s single most important sector and chief source of wealth, presenting a 
significant liability should the flow of revenues be negatively affected. In 2013, the 
year that preceded the sanctions, oil export revenues amounted to 283 billion USD, 
representing 54 percent of the country’s export turnover (see Figure 1). Oil has been 
crucial for the federal budget as well. During the same year, taxes from oil accounted 
for 88 percent of Russia’s hydrocarbon revenues, which in turn constituted half of the 
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The US/EU sanctions have brought several restrictions. Western oil majors 
could not invest in three distinct types of oil fields: unconventional (tight), Arctic 
offshore and deep offshore [12, 13]. Service companies have not been allowed to 
share the necessary technology for such fields. Also, US and EU regulations on 
sanctions have barred leading Russian oil companies as well as banks from accessing 
international finance, except on short-term basis. This has raised the cost of 
borrowing for the Russian oil sector significantly above what international peers have 
to pay [14].  
US/EU sanctions evidently points out to one key intermediary objective: 
hamper the capability of the Russian oil industry to sustain its output in the longer 
run. As examined below (section 3), sanctions caught the Russian oil sector in the 
midst of steadily deteriorating quality of reserves. The oil industry has faced the 
urgent need to meet two critical objectives: optimising its declining mature fields and 
investing in new technologically more challenging deposits. These objectives have 
been included in the government’s draft energy strategy through 2035 [15]. To meet 
these goals, Russia would benefit from access to foreign capital and technology. 
Sanctions have been designed on the recognition of this Russian vulnerability. The 
targeted types of deposits, for instance, have represented the bulk of Russia’s 
prospective “new generation” of oil fields, whose development has emerged 
necessary to sustain output amidst declining mature fields.  
Importantly, the US/EU sanctions have been tailored to target Russia’s long-
term development rather than its existing output. They have cautiously avoided the 
risk of disrupting oil supplies from Russia, ostensibly due to potential repercussions 
for global oil prices. Thus, for instance, mature fields that could potentially be 
optimised, and new conventional fields in some Russian regions, such as East Siberia, 
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have not been directly hit by sanctions. Choosing them as targets could have 
hampered current output.  
 
 
4. Russia’s geological challenge as key vulnerability 
 
The US/EU sanctions were preceded by widely shared gloomy projections 
about Russian oil. A common take coming from oil managers’ statements was that the 
oil industry was on the verge of reaching its peak output, followed by a rapid decline 
[16]. Notwithstanding oil managers’ possible motivations to sound alarming amidst 
continuous negotiations with the government over tax reform, many others also 
expressed quite a pessimistic account of Russia’s oil future. In March 2014, the 
Russian Energy Ministry released an early draft of its updated official Energy 
Strategy through 2035. Its baseline scenario projected the oil sector remaining nearly 
stagnant during the following ten years, followed by a gradual decline. An alternative 
“risk” scenario forecasted an immediate and permanent decline in output [17]. In a 
special edition focusing on Russia, the International Energy Agency’s flagship report 
World Energy Outlook 2011 was even more pessimistic, predicting Russian oil would 
peak before 2015 [18]. This degree of pessimism was reiterated in a report issued in 
2014 by the Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 
foreseeing a decline in oil production before 2020 [19]. 
What drove such rather gloomy forecasts was the steadily declining quality of 
Russia’s oil reserves. On the surface, Russia’s oil output was on a long streak of 
growth, interrupted only briefly in 2008. Yet, one could identify several signs of its 
deteriorating reserve base. First, the high share of mature oil fields (brownfields) was 
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revealing: such fields accounted for 84 percent of the oil output at the onset of the 
sanctions.3 In effect, the Russian oil industry had been able to keep growing thanks to 
fields launched during the Soviet era. However, starting from the second half of the 
2000s, many of these legacy fields, particularly in West Siberia—the heartland of 
Russian oil industry—had started to decline.  
Second, growth in Russia’s oil output became increasingly dependent on 
developing new oil fields (greenfields). Indeed, a handful of greenfields located in 
East Siberia accounted for nearly the entire growth in Russia’s oil output between 
2009 and 2013.4 Typically located further from existing infrastructure, these fields 
have been comparatively costlier and smaller in size than West Siberia’s mature 
fields.  
Third, data on drilling for oil exploration and development signified additional 
reasons for concern. Accordingly, Russian oil companies substantially ramped up 
their development drilling during the decade preceding the sanctions, yet returns kept 
getting smaller.5 The size of Russia’s development drilling market more than 
quadrupled (in dollar terms) between 2005 and 2013, helping to secure only a 
marginal increase in output.6 After 2010, oil majors started to increasingly rely on 
more advanced, though costlier, drilling methods to arrest the decline in mature fields. 
The share of horizontal drilling in oil development had remained steady at around 10 
percent during the 2000s, but rose up sharply to 20.8 percent by 2013 [24]. In the 
																																																								
3 Brownfields defined as all fields except, greenfields, projects conducted under Production Sharing 
Agreements, and condensate [16]. 
4 East Siberian oil grew from 5 million mt in 2009 to 33.1 million mt in 2013. Russia’s total oil output 
grew by 29.1 million mt during this timeframe [21]. 
5 Measured in million meters, development drilling rose 79.9 percent between 2006 and 2013, while oil 
production rose by merely 8.9 percent [22]. 




meantime, the average depth of Russian oil wells continued to get higher, putting an 
upward pressure on drilling and lifting costs [25]. 
By contrast, there was no similar upward trajectory in exploratory drilling 
prior to the sanctions. After reaching a peak in 2007, the amount of drilling 
experienced a major drop in 2009, and did not recover to its earlier peak by 2013. In 
effect, oil companies shifted their investments to development drilling at the expense 
of exploratory drilling [22]. Some oil industry insiders noted that “underinvestment” 
in exploration constituted the biggest long-term hurdle for the future of Russian oil 
[26]. Admittedly, Russian oil companies became more efficient in exploratory drilling 
thanks to adopting more advanced technologies. This allowed the oil sector’s reserve 
base to grow faster than its output after 2005. Nonetheless, only about 15-20 percent 
of this growth in reserves came from new fields. The rest was the product of 
additional exploration in mature regions as well as the oil companies’ re-evaluation of 
their respective reserve base [26]. 
In sum, already before the launch of US/EU sanctions, the Russian oil industry 
was faced with steadily declining mature fields, a growing need to move on to new 
fields, and production costs rising across the board. Its ultimate challenge was to avert 
a downturn in Russia’s oil output for as long as possible. Investing in the 
technologically more challenging deposits, such as in deep offshore, the Arctic 
offshore and unconventional basis was increasingly voiced as a solution [27]. For this, 
Russia needed more investments (domestic and foreign) and continued access to 
advanced technologies. Sanctions clearly set the goal to make this task more 





5. Structural problems in Russia’s oil industry preceding the sanctions 
 
 Russia’s geological challenge was accompanied by a set of problems that 
contributed to this challenge, raising further concerns within the oil industry prior to 
the onset of the US/EU sanctions. This paper labels them as key structural problems 
whose resolution necessitate a policy response by the Russian state. Unlike the 
geological challenge, their origin and resolution lies “above the ground” within the 
Russian government. It is worth devoting attention to each of these structural 
problems prior to 2014.  
 
 
5.1 An oil tax regime geared to maximise state revenues  
 
 An optimal tax regime would aim to strike a balance between the goal of the 
state to collect revenues and the interests of the oil industry to make profit. It should 
also encourage the oil sector to invest in its long-term development. Finding such a 
balance is never a simple task, particularly when the oil industry goes through 
geological challenges that put upward pressure on costs.  
 A key feature of Russia’s oil tax regime has been its propensity to prioritise 
tax revenues at the expense of long-term investments in the sector. The Russian 
government fundamentally overhauled the oil tax at the start of Putin’s first 
presidency [28]. Its strength was its simplicity: designed to track mainly the oil 
companies’ output and gross revenues, the tax model left little room for tax evasion—
a perennial problem during the 1990s. Simplicity, however, came with a major 
drawback. The model did not take into account the divergent costs across Russia’s 
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various fields. Oil companies were left with little incentive to undertake costlier 
projects. They were inclined to delay investing in new fields while shutting down 
highly depleted fields where operating costs were typically higher.  
 After 2007, amidst growing pressure by the oil industry, the Russian 
government adopted a highly cautious approach to reform this tax model. 
Recognising the growing urgency for investing in new oil fields, the government 
provided series of ad hoc tax holidays for select oil deposits. Starting with operators 
of select fields in East Siberia, the list of beneficiaries expanded gradually to include 
some of Russia’s most depleted fields, deposits with extra heavy oil and 
unconventional oil [29]. By 2013, 27 percent of Russia’s oil output was benefiting 
from some form of tax relief [30].  
 On the surface, this cautious approach to tax reform paid off. After a shocking 
drop in 2008, Russia’s oil output resumed growth and remained on an upward 
trajectory during the subsequent period, prior to the onset of sanctions. The tax breaks 
helped to bring new oil from East Siberian greenfield projects and slowed down the 
decline of mature fields [16].  
 Nonetheless, the government’s approach to tax reform was indicative of a 
broader preference to prioritise budgetary revenues rather than addressing the oil 
industry’s concerns head on. Despite tax exemptions, the overall tax burden on the oil 
sector remained fairly high in international standards [31]. Importantly, the 
government’s tax approach defied international trends. Namely, the broader tendency 
around the world in the past four decades has been a gradual shift towards a tax model 
that targets oil companies’ costs and profitability rather than their gross revenues [30]. 
Instead of a comprehensive approach to reform, the Russian leadership opted in 
favour of ad hoc solutions in the form of a growing number of exemptions. Despite 
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some progress, the tax regime remained overall disconnected from project 
profitability [32]. Also, ad hoc exemptions brought a new degree of uncertainty for 
investments. They proved easy to rollback when the Finance Ministry deemed them to 
be overly generous [33].  
 
 
5.2 The oil sector’s organisational setup as a constraint for long-term investments  
 
 The organisational setup of Russia’s oil industry has presented another set of 
constraints for its development. Three key aspects deserve attention: a lack of a level 
playing field that limits the opportunities for small and independent oil companies7; 
primacy assigned to select state-dominated oil majors; and a distinctly limited role for 
foreign oil producers. Problems in each of these areas constrained the investment 
opportunities in Russia’s oil sector prior to sanctions, contributing to its geological 
challenge and increasingly dim production prospects. 
The Russian oil industry has been dominated by a handful of large vertically 
integrated companies (VICs). Former Russian Energy Minister Yuri Shafranik has 
described this as a Soviet legacy, which, despite changes in ownership, has remained 
fundamentally intact during the 1990s and 2000s [35]. In 2013, only 9.5 percent of 
Russia’s oil output came from so-called independent producers [36].  
The minor role played by independent/small oil companies has been 
increasingly at odds with Russia’s geological realities. International practice indicates 
that such companies are more likely to optimise mature and smaller fields [37]. They 
																																																								
7 Russian legislation defines independent oil producers as those that are not part of VICs, not state-




can also be highly innovative in overcoming new geological challenges as illustrated 
in the case of unconventional oil development in the US [37]. Russia could have 
benefited from a policy ensuring a greater role for such players amidst its geological 
shifts.8 
The growing emphasis of the Russian leadership on state-led development in 
the oil sector has been another aspect of the organisational setup that has arguably 
proved costly for the industry as a whole. The origin of this approach, which has 
hampered the level playing field in the sector, goes back to Putin’s first term as 
president. State-controlled Rosneft steadily emerged as Russia’s national oil 
champion [39]. It acquired several of its competitors between 2004 and 2013. 
Financially overstretched with these acquisitions, Rosneft turned into one of Russia’s 
most indebted companies [40].  
In 2008, a new bill regulating investments in so-called strategic sectors set 
exclusive rights for state-owned companies in developing larger onshore fields 
(containing oil above 70 million tons) and all new offshore fields [41]. State-
controlled Rosneft and Gazprom (and by extension, its oil subsidiary Gazprom Neft) 
acquired exclusive rights. Other companies, domestic or foreign, could only set their 
foot on such fields through partnering with them. As the two state-controlled 
companies acquired their licenses for new fields, this prompted concerns about their 
financial capabilities to develop them on schedule [42, 43]. Some critics accused 
Rosneft for abandoning potentially productive older fields, curbing the oil sector’s 
potential growth [44].  
																																																								
8 Incidentally, independent/small producers proved crucial in ensuring Russia’s enduring growth in oil 
production—their share in the total output rose from 5.6 percent to 9.5 percent between 2008 and 2013, 
respectively. This outcome was not a product of a shift in the government’s approach towards these 
companies, as they continued to face the same disadvantages they had encountered since the 1990 [38]. 
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Finally, a peculiar feature of Russia’s oil development model under Putin has 
been the limited involvement of foreign oil companies. This has also curbed their 
potential contribution to utilising the country’s reserve base. In the early 1990s, 
Russia had emerged as the new frontier for international oil companies. But foreign 
majors were soon braced for disappointment. Foreign involvement in Russia’s oil 
industry remained limited during the 1990s, and it got even more difficult over time to 
break in its oil business [45, 46]. The 2008 bill on investments in strategic sectors set 
further limits.  
Despite their rather limited role in Russia’s oil production, foreign companies 
had increasingly emerged at the spotlight before the onset of the West’s sanctions. 
Amidst growing attention to more challenging oil fields, such as the Arctic offshore 
and unconventional oil in the Bazhenov basin, Russian oil companies launched series 
of partnerships with foreign majors. Their technological edge had raised hopes for 
deepening their involvement in Russia [47]. 
 
 
5.3 Russia’s technological lag as a challenge for the oil sector 
 
 Russia has been a leading oil producer for well over a century, yet its 
petroleum industry has chronically suffered a technological lag. This created two key 
challenges prior to the onset of the US/EU sanctions. First, it made the industry 
vulnerable to potential disruptions in transfer of foreign technology. Incidentally, the 
US and the EU designed their sanctions to target the transfer of technology precisely 
in type of fields where Russian oil majors had set their sights for future growth. Many 
of the deals signed with foreign partners had to be put on hold due to sanctions [48].  
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Second, it is possible to argue that Russia’s technological lag impeded the oil 
industry’s ability to explore and develop the more technologically challenging oil 
fields. In turn, deprioritising such fields weakened the necessity to develop own 
advanced technologies. It is worth asking why it took so long for Russian oil 
companies to turn their attention to deeper offshore and Arctic offshore fields. 
Admittedly, this was in part due to Russia’s extensive and diverse reserve base—there 
was less urgency to move to such challenging and expensive fields. Yet, the lack of 
own technological capabilities to explore and develop such fields also played a likely 
role [49]. 
In essence, when Russian oil majors turned their attention to the “new 
generation” fields during the final years preceding the sanctions, the industry 
remained unprepared to deal with potential restrictions on foreign technology. 
Accordingly, in 2014, the extent of dependence of the Russian oil sector on foreign 
technology remained highly critical. Russia’s entire oil services sector had tripled in 
size (in dollar terms) between 2005 and 2014, allowing for the rise of a growing 
number of domestic producers of oil equipment [50]. Yet, foreign oil services 
companies maintained their edge in securing the most advanced technologies for the 
Russian market [51]. They dominated many key market segments such as well 
surveys, offshore development, oilfield chemicals and advanced hydraulic fracturing 
[52]. Digitalisation and information technologies constituted additional areas where 
Russia depended on imported know-how [53]. In 2014, the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade determined that the level of dependence on imports remained at around 80 
percent in “critically” significant parts of the oil and gas industry. In select areas, such 




6. Responding to structural constraints after 2014  
 
 As sanctions aimed to weaken Russia’s ability to address its geological 
challenge, this section analyses the government’s policy response in three critical 
areas that could help neutralise or mitigate the effect of sanctions. It starts with an 
overview of key tendencies in the oil sector, followed by a detailed review of the 
policy response.  
 
 
6.1 The evolution of the oil sector after sanctions 
 
 The US/EU sanctions started targeting Russia’s oil sector by the fall of 2014. 
As a further complicating factor, a substantial drop in oil prices coincidentally 
accompanied these sanctions. During the following five years, oil prices stayed far 
below the levels reached in the 2010-2014 period (Figure 2). While sanctions on the 
transfer of technology were designed to have an impact in the longer run, financial 





Source: RF Central Bank, Rosstat 
 
Figure 2: Russia’s Crude Oil  Production and Oil Prices since 1991 
 
 
Given this context, in a way it has been bewildering that key headline figures 
for Russian oil remained distinctly positive. The industry’s annual output set one post-
Soviet record after another. It kept expanding every year except in 2017 when Russia 
adhered to a deal with OPEC to voluntarily cap production (Figure 2). Growth in 
development drilling was another significant achievement: Russian oil companies 
were drilling 33 percent more in 2018 compared to 2013 [57]. 
There are several factors that explain why Russia’s oil sector has managed to 
weather the impact of sanctions and lower oil prices, at least in the short and medium-
term. First, as the Russian ruble lost about half of its value in 2014, this has provided 
a financial cushion for oil companies, whose costs are denominated predominantly in 
the national currency, while export revenues accrue in dollars [58]. Second, the design 
of the oil tax regime compels the federal budget to absorb most of the impact in the 









































































































sanctions, along a lack of uniform enforcement have also helped. For instance, EU 
sanctions have included a “grandfathering” provision allowing projects launched 
before the sanctions to continue. Regulators in Brussels and EU-member states have 
remained less stringent in enforcing the sanctions compared to US regulators [60]. 
Thus, EU-based international majors such as BP, Equinor (formerly Statoil) and ENI 
have been able to maintain and even expand their existing partnerships in Russia after 
2014, albeit within some limits [61]. Finally, Russian oil majors have managed to 
circumvent some of the financial constraints brought by sanctions. Though sanctions 
set restrictions on access to foreign funds, Russian oil companies have developed 
multiple responses. They have intensified relations with Asian companies as investors 
and a source of funding in exchange for oil supplies. Similar funding arrangements 
for “continuous” short-term funding have been made with foreign oil traders [62].  
Yet, this apparent resilience of the Russian oil sector should not conceal some 
of the intrinsic longer-term challenges it has only postponed to address. Warning 
signs preceding the sanctions have persisted. The deteriorating quality of the reserve 
base has remained as a major challenge. The flow rate of Russian oil wells has 
deteriorated further [63], while the depth of both vertical and horizontal wells has 
been getting higher, adding to production costs [22]. Likewise, sustaining production 
has hinged on adopting increasingly more advanced and typically more costly 
technologies. For instance, the share of horizontal drilling in oil development has kept 
rising, reaching 48 percent by 2018 [64, 65]. 
In the existing context, Russian oil companies have evidently prioritised near-
term growth in production at the expense of dealing with longer-term challenges. 
Namely, the oil industry has largely diverted investments from sanction-affected 
fields (such as the Arctic offshore and unconventional deposits) to regions with 
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established production and infrastructure. Russian oil industry insider Sergey 
Vakulenko describes aptly the oil companies’ response: “why go after higher-hanging 
fruit when there are lower ones available right now [66]?” Also, Russian oil 
companies have maintained their focus on development drilling at the expense of 
exploration drilling. Investments in the latter dropped sharply in 2015 and it took two 
years to recover to the levels reached in 2014 [22]. Incidentally, government funding 
for exploration also declined sharply between 2014 and 2017 [67].  
It might be too early to say whether the West’s sanctions are effectively 
meeting its key intermediary objective—curbing Russia’s ability to develop its “next 
generation” fields. Yet, as the rest of the paper argues, the Russian leadership has 
shied away from developing a thorough approach to addressing key structural 
problems that would affect the oil industry’s longer-term growth potential. Evidently, 
the Russian government has remained focused on ensuring the short and mid-term 
growth in the oil industry, while inadequately helping it to address its longer-term 
geological challenges and build lasting resilience to sanctions. In a way, oil producers 
have responded in a similar fashion prioritising near-term growth.  
 
 
6.2 The tax regime 
 
 The Russian government undertook some significant changes in the oil tax 
regime after 2014. Yet, its approach could at best be characterised as one guided by a 
preference for incremental reform—the approach that preceded the sanctions. There is 
no evidence to suggest that sanctions prompted a wake-up call for the leadership to 
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reconsider its tax policy, paving the way to a more substantial overhaul. What 
explains the government’s approach?  
Changes in Russia’s oil tax regime followed three distinct tracks after 2014. 
First, the government continued to use tax exemptions as its primary tool to spur 
investments. By 2018, 51 percent of Russia’s oil fields and 43 percent of its oil 
production were benefiting from some form of tax relief measures [68]. Second, the 
Russian government undertook several “tax maneuvers” to address market distortions 
created by the tax regime set in the early 2000s. Their main target has been to 
gradually lower the significance of export duties in the oil sector’s tax bill. The first 
steps for this process were initiated well before the sanctions [69]. Third, in 2018, the 
Russian government finally opted to experiment with profit-based taxation by 
introducing the Tax on Supplementary Income (TSI). The new tax has been designed 
to take into account projects’ costs and profitability. Yet it has been applicable to only 
a handful of select pilot projects until the government re-evaluates its effectiveness 
[70]. 
In effect, the government’s tax approach has focused on promoting near-term 
growth rather than tackling the oil industry longer-term geological challenge. Indeed, 
this approach has proven fruitful. Prioritising tax exemptions has helped to prevent a 
decline in Russia’s oil output, potentially delaying its peak. Oil companies have 
ramped up investments in many of the field categories benefiting from tax relief [71]. 
While investments in the three types of fields prohibited by sanctions have remained 
limited overall, Rosneft and Gazprom Neft have made some progress in allocating 
more funds for the Arctic offshore [72]. 
Yet, the chosen approach has signified several problems for the longer-run. 
First, relying on tax relief measures has helped to postpone a transition to a truly 
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profit-based tax regime that could have affected the entire oil sector, incentivising 
investments in areas such as new fields, optimisation of old deposits, and new 
technologies. Limited growth in investments for oil exploration (as opposed to oil 
development) and slow progress in bridging Russia’s technological gap (see 6.4) 
could be considered as the products of this approach. Second, the ad hoc nature of tax 
exemptions has prompted concerns about a lack of a level playing field. Industry 
insiders have accused Rosneft of getting preferential treatment [73]. Third, having no 
clear yardstick about their effectiveness, the Russian government has periodically 
rolled back exemptions, nurturing unpredictability for investors. Finally, the vast 
growth in the number of projects benefiting from tax relief has also created a major 
administrative burden. Thus, government proposals for new reform measures have 
never subsided, further exacerbating uncertainty for oil investors.  
There are several possible explanations for the Russian leadership’s choice. 
First, one needs to question why the government has been able to keep expanding tax 
exemptions in the first place. The comparatively high tax rate on the oil industry has 
provided the government a room for manoeuvring. Russia’s diverse set of fields, 
some easier to develop and at lower costs than others, has also allowed the state to be 
selective in choosing its targets for tax relief, while keeping the tax bill high for 
others. The availability of this option is in fact at the core of Russia’s puzzlingly 
continuous growth that has defied pessimistic forecasts. Yet, as former Deputy 
Energy Minister Vladimir Milov warns, this tool cannot be applied infinitely due to 
growing costs for the budget [74]. The government’s heavy reliance on it is indicative 
of its preference of stopgap solutions.  
Second, the government’s choice to delay a transition to a profit-based tax 
regime reflects its aversion to risks for its federal budget. Oil remains as the chief 
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source of revenue, while comprehensive oil tax reform bears the risks of high upfront 
costs that clash with the government’s financial priorities. The fiscally cautious 
Finance Ministry has remained a critical actor in the process of tax reform, pushing 
back against risky proposals emanating from branch ministries and the oil industry 
[75]. 
Finally, the choice may also reflect the state’s preference for perpetuating an 
interventionist approach to guiding the oil industry. Rather than relying on the inbuilt 
flexibility of a sector-wide profit-based tax regime, the Russian government has 
established a manual supervision over tax relief measures. This has empowered state 
agents such as the Finance Ministry   
 
 
6.3 The organisational setup 
 
The Russian leadership abstained from significant changes in the 
organisational setup of the oil industry in the aftermath of the US/EU’s energy 
sanctions. This approach perpetuated some of the limitations the industry faced prior 
to the sanctions. Meanwhile, the government avoided measures that could have 
further magnified these limitations. 
First, the Russian government took no action to address the existing 
disadvantages for smaller players. Industry insiders have noted that the government’s 
fiscal and licensing policy for the oil industry remained fixated on the needs of the 
VICs [76]. Numerous changes in the tax code between 2014 and 2018 provided no 
special treatment for smaller/independent producers. In fact, some tax measures, such 
as refunds for refining, benefited only the oil majors [77]. 
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Second, the Russian government did not undertake any significant steps to 
alter the organisational setup of the oil industry in terms of its ownership. Two key 
changes revolved around Rosneft. The oil major continued its buying spree by 
acquiring the relatively smaller VIC Bashneft. Meanwhile, the state reduced its shares 
in Rosneft to a mere majority, indicating that the Russian oil sector might be on a 
trajectory that is more complicated beyond a gradual nationalisation. Overall, the 
Russian leadership abstained from triggering another major shakeup in the oil sector. 
It is unclear whether the Kremlin opted to maintain the status quo model of 
ownership due to its aversion to risks or the proven benefits of the model itself. 
Within the existing setup of coexisting private and state-owned oil majors since the 
mid-2000s, the sector has demonstrated its ability to maintain continuous growth. One 
of its key strengths has been the presence of multiple VICs. This distinguishes Russia 
from several oil-producing nations where a national oil company dominates the entire 
sector. The presence of multiple players has ensured some degree of competition, as 
well as diversity in investment strategies in surmounting challenges. In the meantime, 
it is possible to suggest that the Russian leadership avoided undertaking a new 
shakeup because this could be a risky move amidst sanctions and relatively lower oil 
prices. 
Importantly, the Russian government upheld the privileged role of state-
owned companies despite its increasingly obvious costs. Accordingly, it soon became 
clear that the amount of licenses awarded to state-controlled Rosneft and Gazprom for 
offshore fields were beyond their capabilities. Sanctions provided them a convenient 
pretext to request extensions to fulfil the obligations set in their licenses [78]. Rather 
than redistributing these licenses to other players, the government opted to grant the 
requested extensions.  
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Third, the government’s approach to foreign oil companies as investors in 
Russian oil represented another area of continuity. The sanctions disrupted some of 
the established partnerships between foreign majors and Russian companies for 
developing offshore and unconventional oil. Yet, foreign companies maintained their 
cooperation in areas not subject to sanctions, and even made some new acquisitions, 
such as BP’s purchase of a stake in Rosneft’s Taas-Yuryakh field in 2015. Also, the 
Kremlin adhered to the 2008 law regulating investments in strategic sectors, 
introducing only minor amendments [79]. It is noteworthy that the Russian state did 
not opt to reciprocate to Western energy sanctions by establishing further limits on the 
investments of oil companies from the US and the EU.  
In the meantime, non-Western (mainly Chinese) oil companies and service 
providers found growing opportunities in the Russian oil market. Their rising role has 
reflected the steadily growing diversity of foreign players in Russia’s oil sector. While 
this trend preceded the sanctions, attracting non-Western partners to Russia’s oil 
industry has constituted a significant piece of Moscow’s response to sanctions. In 
effect, Russia’s has aimed at reaching out to what Bryan Early describes as third-party 
states that can act as “sanction busters” [80]. In this context, a “pivot to Asia” has 
partly alleviated restrictions on access to technology and capital. Nonetheless, the 
involvement of non-Western companies in Russia’s oil upstream has remained 
relatively modest, while their technology is yet to prove its viability in developing the 
new generation oil fields [81]. 
 What possibly explains the Russian leadership’s notable lack of determination 
to alter the organisation setup of the oil industry is the potentially high, though 
uncertain upfront cost of a major shakeup. Furthermore, these costs could be fairly 
extensive for multiple stakeholders. The political leadership would need to invest 
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political capital to usher major changes, and the state budget may well lose out if 
these changes do not secure oil growth. Existing VICs could lose out to rising 
independents and major changes in ownership—a likely cause for them to defend the 
existing organisational setup. 
 
 
6.4 Bridging the technological gap 
 
 The Russian leadership took numerous actions to address its technological gap 
following the launch of the West’s sanctions. In effect, sanctions have been a wake-up 
call to address this particular structural problem. Yet, the effectiveness of these 
actions has remained limited and their true impact is yet to be proven.   
 At the centre of government’s response to sanctions has been its emphasis on 
“import substitution” in the oil sector. Unlike in the case of the other two structural 
issues examined so far, “import substitution” has featured directly in the Russian 
leadership’s rhetoric on Western sanctions. It appeared as a central theme of Putin’s 
annual address to the nation at the end of 2014, and has remained a recurring element 
of his speeches [82]. Both the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Ministry of 
Energy were quick to announce plans and targets for an ambitious policy to alleviate 
the oil industry’s dependence on foreign equipment [83]. They set up an 
intergovernmental committee to coordinate progress, engaging oil companies and 
tracking their progress in adopting Russian-made technologies [84]. Furthermore, the 
Russian government provided some financial support—14 billion rubles between 
2014 and 2018—to promote investments in locally made oil equipment [53]. It 
adhered to extrabudgetary funds as well. For instance, President Putin’s instructed 
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Rosneftegaz to channel dividends for the development of the Zvezda shipyard in the 
Far East [85]. Under a consortium led by Rosneft, the shipyard project has set the goal 
of enhancing Russian capabilities for offshore drilling [86]. 
 While the precise extent of Russia’s progress in import substitution does not 
appear clear even to Russian government officials [84], the oil industry clearly took 
some steps to reduce its dependence on foreign equipment. Many Russian oil majors 
swiftly announced corporate programs setting targets on using locally produced 
equipment. Reportedly, the share of foreign equipment has been steadily dropping 
after 2014 [87]. Russian oil service companies have regained some of the market 
share they lost to foreign service providers since the early 2000s [88]. Additionally, 
Russian oil producers have expanded their commercial ties with oil service companies 
from Asia—China in particular [89, 90].  
 The government’s proactive approach on alleviating Russia’s technological 
lag in the oil industry is striking when compared to how it handled other structural 
problems examined so far. What differentiates this case is that sanctions brought the 
risk of further deepening Russia’s technological lag had the leadership opted to take 
no action at all. By contrast sanctions could not directly exacerbate problems related 
to the tax regime and the organisational setup. There is an additional factor that 
deserves attention. Drezner suggests that sanctions could create rent-seeking 
opportunities, which target governments may wish to employ [91]. Indeed, import 
substitution appears to have distributional consequences that are potentially beneficial 
for the industry and the state. Along the rising complexity of the Russian oil fields 
since the early 2000s, oil rents had been gradually migrating from oil producing 
companies to oil services companies [16]. Rising costs have signified more 
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opportunities to capture rents from oil producers. In this context, import substitution 
serves to divert increasingly important rents to domestic service providers.  
 And yet, adopting a proactive approach has not been sufficient to deliver the 
desired results. Import substitution in areas relating to advanced technologies—
precisely the areas affected by sanctions—has failed to meet expectations. The 
domestic oil services sector has not been in a position to provide Russian oil 
companies the advanced equipment needed to develop unconventional and deep 
offshore fields [92]. 
Russia’s import substitution policy has clearly faced numerous constraints in 
meeting key targets so far. The drop in oil prices after 2014 prompted Russian oil 
majors to scale back their purchase of equipment, leading to the bankruptcy of many 
local service providers [23]. As noted earlier, Russian oil companies opted to delay 
investments in the type of fields under sanctions, dampening demand for advanced 
technologies. Low oil prices also contributed to this outcome. Equipment for fields 
not affected by sanctions has been freely available to import, further impeding 
progress in import substitution. 
Some of the reasons for import substitution progressing only slowly relate to 
the broader question about why Russia ended up with a technological lag to begin 
with. The Russian oil industry has traditionally allocated few resources for research 
and development, and delivered few patents compared to international oil majors and 
service companies [84]. Instead, the preference has been for importing advanced 
technologies. Intellectual property rights have remained weak [93], while the 
government has delayed identifying and approving a guideline for certifying clear 
standards for Russian made oil technologies [94]. In effect, the Russian government 
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has strived to bridge the oil sector’s technological gap without adequately addressing 
underlying constraints that brought this gap.  
Arguably, the two structural problems examined earlier have also impeded 
progress in import substitution. According to Lukoil’s chairman Vagit Alekperov, the 
tax regime, failing to properly account for costs, has not sufficiently encouraged 
investments in new technologies [95]. Likewise, the limited role of small/independent 
oil producers in the petroleum sector has dampened demand for Russian equipment. 
Reportedly, such companies have preferred to rely almost exclusively on cheaper 






 Russia’s oil sector has confronted an increasingly pertinent geological 
challenge, which international sanctions have aimed to further augment. Three key 
structural constraints have stood at the core of this challenge: the oil tax regime, the 
oil industry’s organisational setup, and its chronic technological lag. Each area has 
presented opportunities for the Russian leadership to develop policies that would 
neutralise of mitigate the impact of sanctions. The paper has provided an in-depth 
review of Russia’s statecraft in developing a response as a target state. 
The Russian government has undertaken a mixed set of responses since the 
onset of sanctions. It has abstained from any significant changes with respect to the 
oil sector’s organisational setup. In the case of the oil tax regime, its preference has 
been to reform it through series of ad hoc stopgap measures in the form of 
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proliferating exemptions. By contrast, it has launched a highly proactive import 
substitution policy to address the oil sector’s technological lag.  
The paper has associated the variation in the government’s response with two 
key factors. First, when sanctions brought the risk of further exacerbating a structural 
problem, the government has emerged more likely to consider sanctions as a wake-up 
call for a proactive policy. Second, potential distributional consequences have also 
been crucial in shaping the government’s policy choice. Addressing Russia’s 
technological gap through import substitution has had clear distributional benefits. By 
contrast, launching sweeping changes in the tax regime and the organisational setup 
of the petroleum industry has borne potentially unpredictable costs for the state and 
the industry itself.  
This paper has highlighted the overall limited extent of Russia’s response to 
neutralise the impact of sanctions. Russian leaders have recognised the need to take 
some action given the vital role the oil industry plays in the country’s political 
economy. However, sanctions have hardly been a wake-up call. The Russian 
government has abstained from undertaking a comprehensive approach to address 
multiple structural problems in the oil sector. Steps taken to bridge the technological 
gap have been significant, though it may be too early to determine how they might 
affect the oil industry’s longer-term development. Furthermore, their effectiveness has 
been compromised by the lack of a more comprehensive response that address the 
additional structural constrains facing the oil sector. Hence, if one would place 
Russia’s response to sanctions on the continuum suggested at the start of this paper, it 
has been far from “smart”. 
Why some countries are more likely to respond “smart” to sanctions, while 
others may be inclined to miss the opportunity? Further research based on cross-
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country and cross-sector comparisons could investigate the sources of variation in 
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